Signalling theory
In a market with no shared prices, shares or benchmarks, actors articulate their position through observable signals. A signal informs to the extent it is costly and hard to fake. The core question: do actors substitute low-cost signals for costly capability evidence?
Signal cost mix
Costly signals (Rieger et al. 2025; Suchman 1995) separate genuine capability from low-cost signalling.
Capability vs legitimacy channel
What an actor can do (Knight & Cavusgil 2004) vs social acceptance (Suchman 1995).
Do low-cost signals track costly ones?
Each point is an actor. X = share of their signals that are low-cost; Y = Cost-Weighted Signal Score. An actor high-right is loud but lightly-backed; an actor high-left is backing its position with costly evidence.
Per-actor breakdown
Cost-Weighted Signal Score = Σ (dimension weight × confidence × cost multiplier). Cost multipliers: high 1.0, medium 0.7, low 0.4. See the methodology for the full model and per-dimension grounding.